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studying the maritime strategy of the US Navy after the Cold War.
SUMMARY
At the end of the Cold War, the US Navy’s strategy and force structure were primarily directed at fighting 
a conventional enemy on the high seas. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the relative certainty of the Cold 
War was replaced by uncertainty about the challenges of the future. A number of threats, such as regional 
rivalry, terrorism, transnational crime, nationalism, and ethnic and religious conflicts, rose to prominence 
during the 1990s, replacing the Soviet Union as the main concern. 
This issue of IFS Insight investigates the Navy’s strategic ideas after 1989 by addressing change and con-
tinuity in the blue water/littoral approaches to sea power in the US Navy. The blue water/littoral priorities 
of the Navy in this period will be illustrated by the Navy’s threat perceptions, the geographical and opera-
tional focus of contemporary strategy documents, as well as the force structure and budgets.
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AFTER THE COLD WAR
APPROACHING THE LITTORALS?
The Cold War was the heyday of the blue water tradition 
in the US Navy, when offensive sea control and aggres-
sive pursuit of the decisive battle were the ideals. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union left the US Navy’s tradi-
tional approach to maritime strategy in limbo, as there 
were no longer any challengers to US sea control and no 
navy that could challenge the US Navy in a decisive bat-
tle. The US Navy responded by focusing on operations 
in coastal areas, so called littoral operations, in order to 
influence events ashore. However, for all the talk about 
littoral operations, there were few indications that the 
US Navy had abandoned its blue water legacy. Quite 
the contrary, this heritage was very much alive. The lit-
toral tendency was only a slight shift of emphasis; the 
blue water focus remained the dominant characteristic 
throughout the post-Cold War period.
Although strategy is ultimately about connecting means 
and ends, there have been quite a few attempts to give 
it a more detailed definition The US Military defines 
strategy as a “prudent idea or set of ideas for employing 
the instruments of national power in a synchronized and 
integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or 
multinational objectives.” (United States Department of 
Defense 2010, 349)1 Using the Cold War as the his-
torical background, this article investigates the Navy’s 
strategic ideas after 1989 by addressing change and 
continuity in the blue water/littoral approaches to sea 
power within the US Navy. I divide the post-Cold War 
era into three distinct periods. In the first, the US Navy’s 
focus was on the rapidly changing and unpredictable 
security environment of the 1990s. During the second 
period, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 un-
leashed the subsequent Global War on Terror, to be-
come the focal point of the Navy, a focus that gradually 
gave way to the third phase, the re-emergence of great 
power rivalry in the service’s strategic thinking around 
2007. The blue water/littoral priorities of the Navy in 
these three periods will be illustrated by the Navy’s per-
ceptions of threat, geographical and operational focus of 
the strategic documents published at the time, as well as 
the force structure and budgets.2
THE COLD WAR
During the Cold war, US Navy ships cruised the world’s 
oceans maintaining international order and exercising 
the containment policy against the Soviet Union, using 
sea control as the basis for power projection. In this Ma-
hanian era, the Soviet Navy was an omnipresent threat 
and peer competitor and planning was primarily aimed 
at defeating it in battle. Following the Second World 
War, the Soviet Navy embarked on an ambitious blue 
water navy programme, and was increasingly capable of 
challenging the US Navy’s ability to exercise sea control. 
In the early stages of the Cold War, Soviet sea denial ca-
pability had yet to extend beyond the immediate waters 
outside its territory. By the early 1970s this capability 
extended to the Norwegian Sea, the Eastern Mediter-
ranean and the Sea of Okhotsk, i.a. raising fears that the 
Soviet Union could deny the US Navy access to vital 
areas, particularly in the Norwegian Sea (Baer 1994, 
394–402). The urgency of the challenge was thrown 
into relief by the 1973 Yom Kippur war, during which 
the US sent major naval forces to the Eastern Mediterra-
nean, but was outnumbered by the Soviet Navy’s assets 
in the area (Goldstein 2004).
Despite this new-found strength, the Soviet Navy was 
defensively oriented, aimed at protecting its strategic 
submarines in so-called bastion defence in the Barents 
Sea, Arctic Ocean and the Sea of Okhotsk. In so doing, 
the Soviet Navy would preserve its nuclear strike capa-
bility behind a solid defence of both surface and sub-
marine forces. The trade -off was a limitation on their 
ability to attack allied shipping, although they still had 
the capability to do so if it was necessary or desirable. 
In 1977, the US Navy started on a course to change its 
strategy in order to exploit this weakness (Baer 1994, 
418–422). This process produced a number of clas-
sified strategies and culminated with the publication 
6of the unclassified The Maritime Strategy in January 
1986, which was the last, published, official strat-
egy for 21 years (Hattendorf 2004, 2008).
The Maritime Strategy was largely based on Alfred 
T. Mahan’s notions of command of the sea.  As the 
most prominent advocate of the blue water tenden-
cy, Mahan believed the ability to control the world’s 
oceans was the main purpose of a great nation’s 
navy. Command of the sea was indivisible, and the 
primary means to attain it was to aggressively pursue 
the decisive battle (Till 2009, 51–54). The Mari-
time Strategy thus embraced an offensive attitude by 
shifting the balance from convoy escort to attacking 
the aforementioned Soviet bastions and deploying 
ground and air forces on the Soviet flanks, more spe-
cifically in Norway, Turkey and Japan. This strategy 
had several aims. It was designed to deter the Soviet 
Union from going to war in the first place, and would 
reassure and support exposed allies in times of crisis. 
In case of war, the first priority was to take out the 
Soviet Union’s maritime component in the nuclear 
deterrence. After destroying the Soviet Navy, the 
US Navy would turn its attention to the battle rag-
ing in central Europe, if indirectly. By “carrying the 
fight to the enemy”, including the Soviet homeland, 
the Navy would divert Soviet forces from the ground 
war in central Europe, as well as maintaining an un-
broken line of supply to the allied forces in Europe 
by preventing Soviet Naval assets from engaging in 
convoy attack in the Atlantic. In short, the US Navy 
picked Europe as the main theatre of war for engag-
ing its blue water force in a Mahanian battle against 
the Soviet threat. 
Concurrent with the development of The Maritime 
Strategy, the Cold War entered one of its tenser pe-
riods with US–Soviet relations turning frosty, a pro-
cess that was reinforced by the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in December 1979. The cooler interna-
tional climate led to increased defence spending and 
during the two presidential terms of Ronald Reagan 
the US defence budget increased by nearly 35 per 
cent from $138 billion in 1981, to $186 in 1988 
(fiscal year 2011 dollars). In large part this increase 
in defence spending facilitated the implementation 
of The Maritime Strategy, as it presupposed a sig-
nificant increase in the US Navy force structure. In 
fact, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman published 
his justification for the naval build up in his article 
“The 600 Ship Navy”, together with The Maritime 
Strategy. This naval build up was accompanied by a 
significant increase in capabilities of the individual 
platforms with the introduction of a range of new, 
state-of-the-art, ships, aircraft, weapons and sen-
sors. Thus, the US Navy came out of the Cold War 
on a high with regards to its equipment and strategy. 
THE 1990S: THE ABSENCE OF THREATS AND THE LITTORAL TENDENCY
The triumphalism that followed victory in the Cold 
War was not without a bitter aftertaste for the US 
Navy. Without the Soviet Union as an enemy, the 
threat on which the Maritime Strategy was based 
had disappeared, and so had the rationale for the 
generous budgets that came with it. As George Baer 
states, in the last chapter of his history of the US 
Navy, “With the disappearing danger of general war, 
the value of a massive US offensive naval response 
disappeared also. In 1989 the US Navy put its am-
bitious testament to sea power ‘on the shelf.’” (Baer 
1994, 444). Two years later, the US Navy was left 
in a supporting role to the Air Force and Army during 
the first Gulf War. 
The challenges of the 1990s were many, and al-
though the Cold War threats were gone, there were 
arguments in favour of maintaining relatively large 
naval forces, the most central being the versatility of 
naval forces, a capability described in Geoffrey Till’s 
book on maritime strategy (2009). The argument 
goes that naval forces are rarely used for their intend-
ed purpose, which is naval combat. It is their ability 
to exploit the international commons, their mobil-
ity and their status as symbols of power that makes 
them useful for anything from diplomatic missions 
to a full-scale naval battle between peer competitors. 
At the end of the Cold War, the US Navy was very 
versatile, but was lacking in the area of littoral op-
7erations, which demand markedly different training, 
equipment and doctrine than blue water operations. 
Despite the argument about naval versatility, the 
fall of the Wall presented the US Navy with a major 
challenge in the 1990s: the obvious lack of a tangi-
ble, hard security threat brought with it uncertainty 
as to which threats and challenges the future would 
bring, and the US Navy struggled to figure out its 
approach to this new situation. At the same time, 
China started figuring more heavily as a regional 
power, although this did not greatly affect the pri-
ority of Europe in the force structure. Throughout 
the 1990s, the Cold War distribution between the 
Atlantic and Pacific fleet, with 55 per cent based in 
the former and 45 per cent in the latter, remained 
unchanged. In addition to strategic uncertainty, the 
armed forces in general were having to deal with 
the “peace dividend” in the form of declining budg-
ets and a reduced force structure. Coupled with 
the relatively large budget deficits facing the Bush 
administration at the time, the resource situation 
would clearly deteriorate. With his Base Force con-
cept of 1990, General Colin Powell, the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), sought to update 
the plans of the US military.3 He expected the armed 
forces to shrink by 25 per cent, and the composi-
tion of its forces restructured to be better equipped 
for meeting the challenges of the new decade, and 
ultimately the new millennium. Technological de-
velopments also meant that equipment came at an 
ever-increasing real-price, making each ship more 
expensive by the year.
Accepting the changes in the security environment, 
the strategic documents of the 1990s intended to 
make use of the superior US blue water capabili-
ties to project power into the littorals and influence 
events ashore.4 However, a careful reading of these 
documents, and an analysis of the current and 
planned force structure as well as the budgets, re-
veal that Mahan’s thoughts were far from buried. On 
the contrary, they were very much alive throughout 
the entire decade, showing that the littoral tendency 
was a shift in emphasis, not a complete transforma-
tion from a blue water to a littoral force. The main 
emphasis thus remained on the traditional blue wa-
ter Navy of the Cold War, with increased importance 
attributed to the littoral operations. 
THE WAY AHEAD: SAILING INTO THE 
LITTORALS?
The challenges of the post-Cold War era are spelled 
out in the US Navy capstone strategic documents of 
the decade. The first strategic publication after the 
Cold War, The Way Ahead, was published in April 
1991, only a month after the end of the hostilities 
of the first Gulf War and in the middle of the process 
that would end in the official dissolution of the Soviet 
Union on 26. December 1991 (Swartz 2010, 188, 
276). The authors recognised these challenges, and 
made the initial move towards placing a heavier em-
phasis on littoral capabilities, although without say-
ing so explicitly. 
Referring to the unravelling Soviet empire, the au-
thors stated, “[n]o longer do we have the sense of 
certainty that accompanies a bipolar power struc-
ture and a central, agreed-upon threat.” Indeed, 
they concluded: “It is time to challenge many of 
our ground rules and assumptions.” (United States 
Navy 1991, 24) The Way Ahead did this to a greater 
degree than perhaps any other strategic document 
published in the 1990s. All the same, its influ-
ence was rather limited, something the naval his-
torian John Hattendorf puts down to the diverting 
effect of public relations scandals and the immedi-
ate needs of active operations overseas (the opera-
tions in the Persian Gulf ), but also the quite radi-
cal changes that were outlined (Hattendorf 2006, 
24). Nevertheless, The Way Ahead deserves a more 
thorough analysis as it reflected the views of sen-
ior officers and officials at the Department of the 
Navy, first and foremost the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, Admiral Frank B. Kelso, but also the Secre-
tary of the Navy, H. Lawrence Garret III and the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, Alfred M. Gray. 
Instead of referring to threats, The Way Ahead pre-
sented a range of challenges for the new decade:
Drives for regional hegemony, resurgent national-
ism, ethnic and religious rivalries, drug trafficking, 
8and terrorism are certain to challenge interna-
tional order during the final decade of this century. 
Within developing nations, dramatic increases in 
population and growing dissatisfaction with the 
perpetual gap between rich and poor will continue 
to be major causes of unrest and insurgency (Unit-
ed States Navy 1991, 25).
These predictions proved in the event quite accurate, 
although the references to them were quite vague 
and undeveloped, indicating that the US Navy was 
uncertain of their extent and geographical location, 
and had problems finding its place in the new secu-
rity environment. 
At the time of The Way Ahead’s publication, the So-
viet Union still existed. Although The Maritime Strat-
egy remained a backup option in the case of a Soviet 
resurgence, the global war scenario was receding, 
and with it two very significant changes are to be 
found. The first pertains to the geographical focus 
of the strategy. The US Navy had been global in its 
operations throughout the Cold War, though with 
priority given to the North Atlantic and the European 
Continent. In The Way Ahead, the authors signalled 
a possible reduced importance for Europe, recognis-
ing a need to “focus on regional contingencies in 
trouble spots”, wherever US national interests were 
involved (United States Navy 1991, 26). The ques-
tion then was how the US Navy best could influence 
the events in these trouble spots, which brings us to 
the second change, namely a re-examination of the 
high seas focus of the Cold War.
Control of the air, sea, and undersea environ-
ments, essential to successful military operations 
on land, will take on a different character but cer-
tainly will be as complex as maintaining control in 
an open-ocean environment (United States Navy 
1991, 28).
Influencing events on land requires naval forces to 
operate in coastal waters. This quote takes sea con-
trol as a given and implicitly warns of an increas-
ing emphasis on littoral operations, stressing the 
essential contribution of naval forces to operations 
on land and the changing character of sea control. It 
would be easy to attribute the emphasis on regional 
contingencies, and the naval forces’ contribution to 
operations ashore, to the influence of the first Gulf 
War. The Navy was unhappy about its role and per-
formance in the first Gulf War, the reasons for which 
will be explained below. However, it was unlikely 
that they had any significant influence, since combat 
operations had finished only a month before publi-
cation, leaving little time to evaluate the lessons and 
incorporate them into the document.
With regards to the resource situation, major budget 
cuts had been made. In 1991, the US Navy budget 
amounted to $162 billion, down from $165 billion 
the year before,5 while personnel counted 571,000, 
down from 583,000 in 1990. These cuts were 
only the beginning of a decade of budget reductions, 
and the new circumstances that faced the US Navy 
were recognised in its first major strategic publica-
tion. To handle the situation, The Way Ahead echoed 
the Base Force concept (a review of the US Military 
which recommended cutting the Navy to a maxi-
mum of 400 ships, or 25 per cent, by 1994/95) in 
stating that it would be “transferring roughly 25% 
of our [the US Navy’s] current inventory of surface 
combatants, the Knox (FF-1052) class frigates, to 
the reserves.” The frigates of the US Navy are pri-
marily meant for anti submarine warfare and escort 
duties, and during the Cold War their primary role 
was to secure the safe transit of men and equip-
ment from the US to other theatres of War, basically 
Europe. With no specific threat to maritime lines of 
communication, there was no great need for frigates, 
and retiring these ships would make room for other 
capabilities that were needed in the post-Cold War 
era, including littoral capabilities.
In addition to the frigates, a number of other cuts 
were planned, reducing the force structure signifi-
cantly from the current number of 526 ships. Al-
though one expected a total reduction of 25 per cent 
(to around 400 ships in total), the force level goal at 
the time was 451 ships. It produced a discrepancy 
of over 50 ships. One explanation for this is that 
many of the ships slated for decommissioning would 
be replaced. Strictly speaking, the passage quoted 
above does not state whether the Navy intended to 
9reduce its forces by 25 per cent, only that it would 
get rid of a certain class of frigates. What advantages 
this “deception” would bring are hard to assess. An-
other, less conspiratorial explanation puts it down 
to different ways of counting ships. Nevertheless, 
warnings of the force reductions were not empty 
rhetoric, and by the end of the decade, the US Navy 
force structure had indeed been reduced by 44 per 
cent compared to the 1991 levels (O’Rourke 2010).
… FROM THE SEA
Published in September 1992, …From the Sea is 
one of the most widely cited Navy documents of 
the post-Cold War period, gaining prominence as 
an expression of US Navy and Marine Corps stra-
tegic thinking. The document was designed to take 
the US Navy into the 21st century, and was debated 
widely both in Navy and civilian circles. Its primary 
aim was “to engender a fundamental shift in naval 
thinking-away from the open ocean confrontation 
with the Soviet Navy, and toward a much more sub-
tle and more flexible use of naval forces commen-
surate with a more uncertain strategic environment” 
(Smith 1999, 267) and to “overcome Desert Storm’s 
[the first Gulf War] negative legacy” (Swartz 2010, 
679) in the US Navy. The general perception of that 
conflict within the service was that it had been left in 
a purely supporting role, without much influence on 
events. From the Sea was designed to make the Navy 
relevant in the post-Cold War era by doing exactly 
what the title suggests, influencing events on land 
from the sea.
With regards to challenges and threats, From the Sea 
was even less specific than The Way Ahead, describ-
ing them in a very elusive way as “uncertainty in re-
gions critical to our national interest.” (United States 
Navy 1992, 89). The Way Ahead listed a range of 
strategic challenges likely to be prevalent in the fu-
ture, but many of these would be absent from From 
the Sea. Apart from vague references to regional 
crisis response, strongly influenced by the lessons 
learned from the Gulf War where the US had faced 
a regional power and defeated it in regular combat, 
there were no attempts to give any indications of 
specific threats. From the Sea was not based on what 
the US Navy perceived as maritime or naval threats 
and challenges to the United States, but on what the 
Navy could, or wanted to be able to do. This trait 
was common to all of the documents published in 
the 1990s.
What the US Navy wanted to do was to conduct lit-
toral operations aimed at influencing events ashore, 
as Rhodes says, “‘…From the Sea’ unequivocally 
endorsed a littoral approach” (Rhodes 1999, 13). 
While there was little discussion of the sea control 
dimension in the document, there was a clear policy 
statement: “[w]ith the demise of the Soviet Union, 
the free nations of the world claim preeminent con-
trol of the seas and ensure freedom of commercial 
maritime passage.” (United States Navy 1992, 89). 
Given control of the high seas, the reasoning went, 
the remaining areas of likely contention were the 
littorals. To reiterate, the littorals were defined as 
the “‘near land’ areas of the world”, and they were 
divided into two segments, seaward and landward. 
The seaward segment was “[t]he area from the open 
ocean to the shore which must be controlled to sup-
port operations ashore”, while the landward segment 
was “[t]he area inland from shore that can be sup-
ported and defended directly from the sea.” (United 
States Navy 1992, 92). That this was a significant 
proportion of the world’s land mass was aptly illus-
trated by this map:
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Although confident of US Navy capabilities, warn-
ings were issued against assuming control of the 
coastal areas on the basis of the command of the sea 
exercised by the US Navy at the time. The primary 
concerns were the threats posed by submarines, 
mines, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. The 
strong littoral orientation of From the Sea continued 
the changes initiated by The Way Ahead, cementing 
the move away from the blue water focus of the Cold 
War. 
Despite the uncertainties of the post-Cold War 
world, one thing seems to have been regarded as a 
“safe bet”: There seemed to be general consensus 
within the US Navy that, after its official dissolution 
in 1991, there would be no Soviet resurgence; in-
deed, the country was only mentioned twice in the 
entire document, both with reference to its demise. 
Perhaps as a result of this, the greatest difference 
in geographical focus between The Way Ahead and 
From the Sea was that Europe was not mentioned in 
the latter. This could be interpreted as a confirma-
tion of the reduced importance of Europe and the 
Atlantic as an operational theatre, but retaining close 
relation with European navies in operations else-
where, like the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, Africa and 
the Caribbean. From the Sea advocated a global com-
mitment with a specific reference to regional conflict, 
although not as explicitly as The Way Ahead. This 
generality, both in terms of threats and geographic 
priorities, comes across in the proposed tasks of the 
US Navy: “Our forces can help to shape the future in 
ways favorable to our interests by underpinning our 
alliances, precluding threats, and helping to preserve 
the strategic position we won with the end of the 
Cold War.” (United States Navy 1992, 89). This is 
very general, and avoids drawing up any priorities, re-
inforcing the impression that the US Navy was hav-
ing difficulties finding its place in the 1990s. Seen 
as a whole, From the Sea avoided making choices on 
what it considered to be threats and challenges, and 
the geographic area on which to focus. The only real 
choice it made was to make explicit the littoral focus 
of The Way Ahead, but whether this was a choice 
that was seen to entail substantive changes to the 
organisation is open to question.
FIGURE 1: The map illustrates which parts of the world are within 650 nautical miles of the coastal region, con-
sidered to be the range of naval strike. The authors of From the Sea defined these areas to be a part of the littorals.
 = Within 650 nautical miles of coastal region, the striking range of Naval Forces.
    (United States Navy 1992, 92)
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What is interesting about the period around the 
publication of From the Sea is that the significant 
changes in operating environment addressed in The 
Way Ahead were carried over and extended in the 
new strategic document, without grounding them 
in any particular threat or challenge. Combined with 
the lack of visible change in the current and planned 
force structure, it suggests a navy that was struggling 
to find its proper place in a thoroughly transformed 
security environment.
In other words, From the Sea amplified the sense of 
uncertainty concerning threats and challenges, and 
the US Navy’s place in the new strategic environ-
ment. The US Navy seemed to be uncertain of what 
constituted these changes and how they affected the 
Naval Services, and this sense of uncertainty seemed 
to be reflected in their insistence on a scaled-down 
Cold War-style force structure in its shipbuilding 
programmes. At the time, the Department of De-
fense configured its force sizing requirements at be-
ing able to win two major regional wars at the same 
time; the Battle Force goal had not changed since 
The Way Ahead, and stayed at 451 ships.
The end of the Cold War and the Gulf War together 
created fears that the US Navy “could possibly be 
considered less relevant to post-Cold War environ-
ment & [sic] conflicts than other services.” (Swartz 
2010, 343). Considering the declining budgets and 
the expectations of a peace dividend, this was a ma-
jor concern as it could potentially leave the Navy in a 
very difficult position if this attitude gained foothold 
in political circles. By 1992, the budget had been 
cut by $19 billion from 1991, and amounted to 
$143 billion. The number of personnel was declin-
ing as well, down by 29,000 to a total of 542,000 
since 1991 (Swartz 2010, 276).  Avoiding being 
side-lined by the other services was perhaps espe-
cially important in the autumn of 1992, with presi-
dential elections in the offing, and it was important 
to have a strategic platform ready in the case of a 
change of administration (the elections ousted Presi-
dent George H. W. Bush from office after one term, 
and President Bill Clinton was inaugurated on Janu-
ary 20, 1993. 
In an environment of budget cuts, there were few 
incentives to invest in new programmes aimed at lit-
toral operations. The logical course was to adapt the 
existing force structure to the “two major regional 
wars”, or littoral, standard. Nevertheless, as Peter 
Swartz has pointed out, some of the criticism of 
the strategy concerned the lack of programmes, and 
funds, to back up the littoral focus of From the Sea 
(2010, 708). This is evident also in the 1992 Pos-
ture Statement.  All of the programmes cited in this 
document were either based on, or direct continu-
ations of, Cold War legacy platforms, with no clear 
attempts to adjust them to operating in the littorals. 
While “Navy force structure will be prioritized in fa-
vor of a ship mix optimized to project power ashore 
in regional crises in support of the national strategy”, 
there was no real effort to increase the proportion 
of ships capable of operating in the littorals (United 
States Navy 1992, 18, 25).
The only shipbuilding programme that can be said 
to have had a distinctly littoral aim was the new 
class of amphibious ships, although it would only 
replace predecessors already programmed for re-
tirement (United States Navy 1992, 25–26). Im-
portant to note, however, is the fact that this new 
class would be significantly larger and represent a 
real improvement in amphibious capabilities. Fur-
thermore, the Navy invested considerable resources 
in new aircraft, weapons systems and sensors, such 
as precision guided ammunition, the F-18 fighter 
aircraft and the AEGIS combat system, giving very 
real increases in Navy littoral capabilities. Neverthe-
less, the conclusion, then, seems to be there were 
no new shipbuilding programmes specifically aimed 
at operating in the littorals, and, with the addition 
of new technology, the old force structure seemed 
to be considered capable of fulfilling the aims of the 
new strategy. This indicates that the Navy was not 
prepared to wholly commit to a littoral strategy, and 
preferred to hedge its bets. This is neither unreason-
able nor surprising: From the Sea was criticised in-
ternally for neglecting the blue water aspect of naval 
operations, suggesting resistance to the littoral focus 
in the Navy (Swartz 2010, 709).
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FORWARD FROM THE SEA: 
RESTORING MAHAN?
Forward From the Sea was published in November 
1994, two years after From the Sea, and was intend-
ed to update and expand “the strategic concepts ar-
ticulated in [the US Navy’s] 1992 paper to address 
specifically the unique contributions of naval expedi-
tionary forces in peacetime operations, in responding 
to crises, and in regional conflicts.” (United States 
Navy 1994, 150). The document was published in 
the second year of the Clinton administration amid 
declining budgets and turmoil in the Balkans and 
Somalia, and the document articulated a partial re-
versal of the littoral path taken in From the Sea.
The first and most obvious update in the context of 
this article is the clarification of the most prominent 
threat, or challenge, in the current security environ-
ment. Referring to the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and 
the 1994 National Security Strategy of Engagement 
and Enlargement, it was stated that 
A major review of strategy and force requirements 
resulted in a shift in the Department of Defense’s 
focus to new dangers—chief among which is ag-
gression by regional powers—and the necessity for 
our military forces to be able to rapidly project de-
cisive military power to protect vital U.S. interests 
and defend friends and allies (United States Navy 
1994, 151).
With the 1991 Gulf War and the Balkan civil war 
in mind, and with the Pentagon still force-sizing 
for two major regional wars, aggression by regional 
powers was considered to be the most imminent 
threat. This made Forward From the Sea somewhat 
more concrete on the threat issue than From the Sea, 
although it was still fairly general. It did not define 
the scope of the threat or its location, nor did it ad-
dress issues such as terrorism, piracy, drug traffick-
ing and specific threats to the US homeland. Pos-
sibly influenced by internal opposition to the littoral 
approach, strategic thinking was geared to meeting 
the challenge of regional aggressors primarily by 
naval forces designed to win wars, reaffirming the 
importance of traditional sea control operations in 
an apparent attempt to satisfy both littoral and blue 
water proponents.
More specifically, the Navy’s primary warfighting 
contribution was in four different areas: strategic de-
terrence (which refers to the United States’ nuclear 
weapons); sea control; maritime supremacy; and 
finally strategic sealift, defined by the US Depart-
ment of Defense as “[t]he afloat pre-positioning and 
ocean movement of military materiel in support of 
US and multinational forces. Sealift forces include 
organic [part of the US Navy] and commercially 
acquired shipping and shipping services, including 
chartered foreign-flag vessels and associated ship-
ping services.” (United States Department of De-
fense 2010, 517) In addition to such conventional 
naval tasks, there was for the first time an emphasis 
on preventing conflicts (Swartz 2010, 384). This 
was grounded in “recent experiences”, but without 
further explanation of which experiences. It probably 
referred primarily to the First Gulf War, but also to 
the Balkan conflicts and the Somali civil war which 
were ongoing at the time. What this actually entailed 
was not explained, except that it presupposed the 
forward presence of US Naval vessels and ability to 
conduct power projection.
To project power, the US Navy had to operate in 
the littorals, which continued to be a priority for the 
US Navy in Forward From the Sea. The strategy thus 
provided some continuity on this issue, although the 
littoral dimension was less prominent than in the 
previous strategy. In the document, there is a graph 
detailing “Support of Littoral Warfare” to about 20 
per cent of the total Navy budget in 1994. As was 
pointed out previously, the Department of the Navy 
was criticised for not backing up the littoral focus 
of the previous strategy with the appropriate invest-
ments in littoral programmes, and this was probably 
intended to meet that criticism by showing substan-
tial investments. There was, however, no definition 
of what “support of littoral warfare” meant in prac-
tice, and no references to the source of these num-
bers, making it difficult to put them in perspective. It 
also makes the document seem like a balancing act 
between policies favouring a stronger littoral accent 
and those advocating a blue water focus. 
Furthermore, the geographical priorities seem to 
have been shifting. Referring to the United States 
as a maritime nation, vital US national interests 
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were said to be at the “endpoint of ‘highways of the 
seas’”, and these “endpoints coincide with the plac-
es to which we routinely deploy naval expeditionary 
forces: the Atlantic, Mediterranean, Pacific, Indian 
Ocean, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Caribbean Sea.” 
The “endpoints of these highways” obviously refers 
to populated areas along the coast, re-affirming the 
importance of the littorals. Looking at the areas con-
sidered to be of vital national interest, and thus the 
most relevant areas for conducting littoral opera-
tions in, there are detectable signs of change from 
the Cold War operating theatres. The mentioning of 
the Indian Ocean, not traditionally an area of focus 
for the US Navy, was quite new. So was the realisa-
tion that “[r]eductions in fiscal resources […] dictate 
that we must refocus our more limited naval assets 
on the highest priorities and the most immediate 
challenges, even within these areas of historic and 
vital interest to the United States.” (United States 
Navy 1994, 151) Although the manner in which 
these regions would be prioritised was not specified, 
it suggests that European waters, and particularly 
the Atlantic region, having been the main focus of 
the US Navy throughout the Cold War, were losing 
some of their pre-eminence. The Mediterranean was 
perhaps an exception, considering the operations in 
the Balkans.
This is quite significant, as it was the first time that 
an official US Navy strategy had seriously reviewed 
the geographical priorities after the Cold War, and 
was possibly a harbinger of the shift in the balance 
of forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific that would 
take place 15 years later. At the time, though, there 
were no changes in the distribution of ships. The 
ships based in the Atlantic totalled 55 per cent of 
the fleet, while the rest was based in the Pacific (the 
US Navy had four active fleets at the time, the 2nd 
and 6th fleet operated in the Atlantic and the Medi-
terranean respectively, 3rd fleet in the Eastern Pacific 
and 7th in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean). 
The force structure goal at the time was a total of 
346 ships, a significant reduction from the previ-
ous 451 ships, but still significantly below the 391 
ships that made up the US Navy at the time. And 
the declining budget made it clear that force levels 
would continue to drop. The Navy’s budget had at 
this point declined to $117 billion, down $15 bil-
lion from 1993, and the total number of personnel 
had declined to 469,000, down by 41,000 from 
1993. In the midst of an economic recovery, the 
Clinton administration was still planning cuts in 
the defence budget, although they would not be as 
dramatic as they were in the first four years of the 
1990s (Swartz 2010, 276). The force composition 
plans at the time were similar to those of 1992, and 
without specific programmes aimed at the littorals, 
Forward From the Sea, just like From the Sea, was 
criticised for the lack of tangible investments in lit-
toral capabilities.
ANYTIME, ANYWHERE: 
A NAVY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
Published in 1997, Anytime, Anywhere was the last 
strategic document of the 1990s, and a strategic vi-
sion of how the US Navy intended to approach the 
current and future security environment. It was not, 
however, intended to supersede From the Sea or For-
ward From the Sea. The vision contained a renewed 
emphasis on traditional sea control operations, al-
though it did not address any strategic threats or 
challenges. The closest it got was to reintroduce 
concerns about anti access weapons, which are 
designed to prevent an enemy, in this case the US, 
from gaining access to an area.
I [Admiral Johnson, Chief of Naval Operations] 
anticipate that the next century will see [our] foes 
striving to target concentrations of troops and ma-
teriel ashore and attack our forces at sea and in 
the air. This is more than a sea-denial threat or a 
Navy problem; it is an area-denial threat whose 
defeat or negation will become the single most 
crucial element in projecting and sustaining US 
military power where it is needed (United States 
Navy 1997, 174).
The new emphasis on sea control was fairly clear in 
that Mahan was regarded as a highly relevant ref-
erence point for the US Navy: “Mahan was right: 
navies are about more than just fighting other na-
vies; they are powerful instruments of national policy 
whose special strength stems from their ability to 
command the seas.” This development was clearly 
influenced by the 1995–1996 Taiwan Straits Cri-
14
sis, where China accused Washington of encour-
aging Taiwan to “seek formal sovereign independ-
ence” from China (Ross 2000, 88). The event that 
triggered the crisis was the USA’s granting of a visa 
to the Taiwanese president, reversing a long stand-
ing practice, to attend a reunion at a US university. 
China reacted by conducting several missile tests 
close to Taiwan. The ensuing tension between the 
US and China prompted Washington to send several 
warships, including two carrier battle groups, to the 
region, and it is likely the potential for armed con-
flict with China prompted the US Navy to once again 
emphasise blue water operations. Furthermore, and 
more or less precluding any potential amphibious 
operations, there was a general sense of scepticism 
in the US to ground intervention overseas, primarily 
as a result of the casualties sustained in the failed 
United Nations intervention in the Somali civil war. 
Starting as a purely humanitarian venture in 1992, 
the UN forces ultimately became embroiled in the 
internal Somali power struggle when they started 
targeting the forces of a local warlord. The US com-
mitment ended after 18 US soldiers and thousands 
of Somalis were killed in a fire-fight in the Somali 
capital of Mogadishu in October 1993.
Although these events influenced the authors of 
Anytime, Anywhere, one must not credit them with 
single-handedly facilitating the return of Mahan to 
US Navy strategy. It is hard to imagine this miniature 
“Mahanian renaissance” as the sole product of these 
incidents, though they probably catalysed the return 
to theories and sentiments that were still very much 
alive in the US Navy. Despite this renewed interest in 
Mahan’s theories, the littorals had not been forgot-
ten by the authors: “As precision weapons become 
cheaper and more numerous, naval dominance of 
the littorals will acquire a new scale and importance.” 
(United States Navy 1997, 175) The dominance of 
the littorals was to be merged seamlessly with tradi-
tional sea control in order to create what was termed 
‘expanded sea control’, once again in an effort to 
balance littoral and blue water policies. In addition, 
control over land areas was considered to be equally 
important in order to defend the Navy’s assets. This 
area control was predicted to combine with battles-
pace dominance, and in concert they would 
encompass everything from an information war-
fare battle of surveillance systems, to precise 
strikes against critical surveillance nodes, to theat-
er missile defense, to command, control, commu-
nications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and a cooperative 
engagement capability that includes a compre-
hensive defense of both the fleet and forces ashore 
(United States Navy 1997, 174).
The emphasis on area control and battlespace 
dominance was a further development of the Navy 
Operational Concept (NOC), published only a few 
months before. One of the key individuals behind 
the NOC, Vice Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski, devel-
oped the network-centric warfare concept, which 
was published a month after the NOC (Hattendorf 
2006, 160). The network-centric warfare concept 
uses information technology in order to integrate 
ships, aircraft and shore installations into computer 
networks. These networks facilitate the exchange of 
large amounts of information, allowing all units to 
have a common picture of a combat situation. This 
means, in simplified terms, that everyone knows 
where friendly units are and what they are doing, 
and all available information about the enemy is 
shared instantly. In addition to influencing Anytime, 
Anywhere and the Navy, the concept has had a major 
impact on the US military in general. The technolog-
ical advances that facilitated this concept, and other 
technologies as well, increased capabilities both on 
the high seas and in the littorals but also made them 
ever more expensive, and in the 1990s’ climate of 
depleting budgets it only added to the difficult eco-
nomic situation.
Although Anytime, Anywhere did not address the ge-
ographical priorities of the US Navy, the Navy lead-
ership had clearly made some decisions regarding 
this issue. The most obvious was the creation of the 
5th fleet in 1995, with headquarters in Bahrain and 
the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and Arabian Sea as its 
area of responsibility.
The force goal of the Navy at the time had been 
reduced to 305 ships, still below the current force 
level of 357 ships. With regards to the shipbuild-
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ing programmes that were planned at the time, 
there was one significant development in the three 
years that had passed since Forward From the Sea 
was published. The US Navy was planning a 21st 
century destroyer intended to operate in the littorals, 
and the Navy wanted a total of 32 hulls.6 Being the 
first littoral-specific programme of the 1990s, it re-
ceived its first mention in the Posture Statements in 
the 1997 version, but had been discussed inside the 
Navy since the early/mid 1990s (O’Rourke 2010, 
3). In 1999, the Navy initiated the Streetfighter pro-
ject, intended to produce a relatively small ship tai-
lored to traditional naval combat in littoral waters; it 
was never translated into a shipbuilding programme, 
however. Instead, the Navy started the Littoral Com-
bat Ship programme in 2001.
INTO THE LITTORALS … 
WITH A BLUE WATER NAVY
Overall, the picture that emerges of the 1990s is 
that of a navy lacking in strategic direction. While 
the US Navy was quick to understand the need to 
adapt strategies to the post-Cold War situation, it 
never produced a strategy that identified threats 
and provided resources and guidance to meet those 
threats. What it did do was focus on operations, sail-
ing from the high seas and into the littorals. As Ed-
ward Rhodes put it,
Central to the Navy’s effort to link naval power to 
national security in the new century has been the 
rejection of Mahanian notions of naval power, with 
their emphasis on the control of the international 
commons, and the embrace of the assumption 
that to be relevant to American security objec-
tives, naval power must be applied “from the sea” 
against sovereign transoceanic actors (Rhodes 
1999, 1).
In the absence of a Soviet threat or other major con-
ventional challenger, the documents emphasised the 
littorals, if to varying degrees. The strategies also 
opened up for a change in the geographic priorities 
of the US Navy, although no major revision of priori-
ties took place. 
The lack of strategic direction was evident in the 
strategies’ approach to force structure, as well as 
the current and planned force structure throughout 
the 1990s. In all three cases, the strategies aimed 
mainly at blue water operations. The strategists’ 
long-standing insistence on using the Cold War-
legacy platforms in the littorals and their assertion in 
Anytime, Anywhere that “Mahan was right”, suggests 
that the idea of blue water operations was never dis-
carded. And despite the plans for a new littoral com-
batant in the form of a new destroyer, shipbuilding 
plans between 1991 and 1997 suggest that blue 
water operations retained a prominent position in 
the US Navy, and that Anytime, Anywhere was more 
representative of the mindset of the US Navy than 
many of the other strategic documents. The above-
quoted passage by Rhodes therefore needs correct-
ing, as Mahan was far from being rejected in the US 
Navy during the 1990s. Increasing interest in the 
Mahanian tradition towards the end of the decade 
can be seen in connection with the rising power of 
China, another issue attracting widening concern, 
especially after the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–
1996. Consequently, rather than a full scale conver-
sion to a littoral navy, a balance was struck between 
Mahan’s blue water school and a littoral direction 
with an emphasis on Mahan.
This balance is particularly evident in the force struc-
ture figures and shipbuilding plans of the decade.
The process of downsizing the Navy was part and 
parcel of the effort to downsize US armed forces in 
general, and started with the Base Force concept. As 
was previously pointed out, the US Navy lost 44 per 
cent of its size in this decade, a sizeable cut, much 
of it what is termed “other” ships, primarily logistics 
and support ships. The combat capable ships were 
reduced by 41 per cent, and some ship categories 
stand out. The strategic submarines lost much of 
their rationale with the end of the Cold War, and 
were reduced by 50 per cent. The number of attack 
submarines was reduced drastically in the 1990s. 
Being designed essentially for open ocean combat, 
these ships were one of the US Navy’s major blue 
water capabilities, and the cut from 96 to 57 nuclear 
powered hulls was a substantial 41 per cent reduc-
tion. With the additional loss of three convention-
ally powered submarines, much of the Navy’s blue 
water capability was removed. And as with the at-
16
tack submarines the number of major surface ships 
was reduced quite drastically. The Battleships had 
first been decommissioned in 1969, only to be re-
commissioned with the naval build up of the 1980s. 
They had been obsolete for quite a few years in the 
blue water navy of the Cold War, but their decom-
missioning was lamented by the Marine Corps due 
to their shore bombardment capabilities. More rel-
evant than the scrapping of an obsolete class of ships 
from World War Two was the decommissioning of 
large numbers frigates. Their numbers were reduced 
by a substantial 63 per cent from 1989 to 1999 
which made up the bulk of the cuts in surface war-
ships. As mentioned above, the decision to reduce 
the number of frigates was taken in the early 1990s. 
The frigates were being decommissioned because 
they were “primarily designed for the ASW [anti 
submarine warfare] convoy mission” (United States 
Navy 1991, 34), a mission that was thought would 
lose some of its importance in the absence of the 
Soviet Navy. The decommissioning of the frigates left 
more room for focusing on post-Cold War missions, 
like littoral combat. 
Looking at other types of ships, there are a few types 
of hulls that stand out on the basis of changes in their 
number. First of all, patrol craft did not disappear 
from the US Navy, they were just not included in the 
Battle Force anymore. Exclusively littoral combat-
ants, they were nevertheless primarily intended for 
homeland security missions, and, with a total of 14 
hulls, they were too few to significantly increase the 
littoral capabilities of the US Navy. The increasing 
number of mine warfare ships is a sign that littoral 
operations were considered more important in the 
1990s. Constituting a major threat to a littoral oper-
ation, mines would need to be cleared if the US Navy 
was serious about securing access to coastal regions, 
a lesson that was learned during the 1991 Gulf War, 
when mines hampered operations. Another essen-
tial littoral capability, the contingent of amphibious 
ships, was slashed by 37 per cent. Questions can be 
raised as to why the amphibious capabilities, highly 
relevant to littoral operations, were reduced to the 
extent that they were, however one must be careful 
not to jump to conclusions, as the old ships were 
being replaced by significantly more capable ones.
But this increase in capabilities was a general trait 
of the 1990s, affecting not only the amphibious 
ships or the US Navy, but many of the armed forces 
around the world. Many of the US Navy’s old ships, 
weapons systems and sensors were being replaced 
by cutting edge systems that significantly increased 
each individual ship’s capabilities, so the reduction 
in fleet size did not result in a proportionate reduc-
tion in capabilities. Some of these new systems were 
intended for operations in the littorals, like the Tom-
ahawk missile, but they did not represent a major 
effort to go from a blue water Navy to a littoral Navy. 
Also, the great majority of ships and shipbuilding 
plans focused on blue water hulls, the exceptions 
being the planning of a new littoral destroyer and the 
Streetfighter concept, although these plans had not 
translated into concrete programmes by the turn of 
the 21st century. It is therefore safe to conclude that 
the Navy at the onset of the new millennium was, 
both in its strategies and force structure, essentially a 
scaled down Cold War version incorporating limited 
littoral capabilities.
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GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR
On October 12, 2000, the destroyer USS Cole was 
struck by a suicide bomber using a small boat loaded 
with explosives. This attack marked the start of the 
rise of terrorism in US security policy, and prompted 
the US Navy to take immediate steps to increase 
port, harbour and coastal defence forces. But the 
major change came 11 months later. The events of 
September 11 2001 changed the strategic environ-
ment, and the budget cuts of the 1990s were re-
versed for the rest of the decade. A single morning 
had put paid to any doubts concerning the threats 
to the United States, and concerns about regional 
conflict, China included, were overshadowed by the 
perception of a looming terrorist threat.
The capstone strategic document of this period, Sea 
Power 21, was obviously influenced by 9/11, as it 
indeed acknowledges (United States Navy 2002). 
As with the 1990s, the Navy never lost sight of the 
blue water dimension, which remained the most 
important. However it re-emphasised littoral opera-
tions, which, together with the contemporary force 
structure plans, represents perhaps the height of 
littoral planning in the post-Cold War period. This 
burst of interest was rather short-lived. Towards the 
middle of the decade the Navy started looking be-
yond the conflicts of the war on terror, turning its 
gaze towards China and traditional blue water con-
cerns (O’Rourke 2005, 3).
SEA POWER 21
Sea Power 21 was published in October 2002, al-
most a year to the day of the invasion of Afghani-
stan, Operation Enduring Freedom. It was a strategic 
vision intended to “realize the opportunities [of the 
21st century] and navigate the challenges ahead”, 
TABLE 1: This table shows the total number of ships in the Battle Force of the US Navy and the percentage cut or 
increase during the 1990s. Click on the ship category for more information about the ships. Conventional submarines 
are not linked to any source, as the US Navy has decommissioned all the ships and no longer have any fact files on 
them. For links on the amphibious ships, see endnote 7. (O’Rourke 2010)
SHIP CATEGORY FY1989 FY1994 FY1999 % CUT/INCREASE
Strategic Submarines 36 18 18 -50 %
Cruise missile Submarines 0 0 0  
Nuclear fuelled attack submarines 96 88 57 -41 %
Conventional attack submarine 3 0 0 -100 %
Aircraft Carriers 15 12 12 -20 %
Battleship 4 0 0 -100 %
Cruiser 40 35 27 -33 %
Destroyer 68 41 52 -24 %
Frigate 100 51 37 -63 %
LCS 0 0 0  
Patrol craft 6 0 0 -100 %
Mine warfare 5 15 16 220 %
Amphibious7 65 42 41 -37 %
Other 128 89 57 -55 %
Total 566 391 317 -44 %
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and it was heavily influenced by the terrorist attacks 
the previous year (United States Navy 2002). The 
threat of terrorism in general is apparent through-
out the document, but the increasing tension across 
the Taiwan Strait, especially after the election of the 
first pro-independent Taiwanese president and the 
collision between a US and Chinese aircraft off the 
coast of China, was not forgotten. Both of these is-
sues came at a time of increasing defence spending 
in the United States. 
Comparing this strategy to Anytime, Anywhere and 
the other strategic documents of the 1990s, it is 
obvious that they differ quite significantly in many 
ways. One of the most apparent changes is the per-
ception of threats. The lack of specificity that charac-
terised the 1990s was replaced by a relative level of 
certainty. The primary sources of the 21st century’s 
threats were stated to be “nations poised for con-
flict in key regions, widely dispersed and well-funded 
terrorist and criminal organizations, and failed states 
that deliver only despair to their people”, although no 
specific actors were mentioned. The focus on con-
ventional, regional conflicts had thus been expanded 
to encompass issues that were not traditionally mili-
tary in nature, representing, in Geoffrey Till’s terms, 
a step in the post-modern direction (Till 2009). 
More specifically, it was stated in Sea Power 21 that: 
threats will be varied and deadly, including weap-
ons of mass destruction, conventional warfare, 
and widespread terrorism. Future enemies will 
attempt to deny us access to critical areas of the 
world, threaten vital friends and interests overseas, 
and even try to conduct further attacks against the 
American homeland.
These threats figured prominently throughout the 
document. The authors referred to conventional 
warfare in the form of amphibious operations and 
sea control: “Sea Shield [a defensive US Navy con-
cept] will protect our national interests with layered 
global defensive power based on control of the seas 
[italics added by author], forward presence, and net-
worked intelligence.” (United States Navy 2002) 
The attention devoted to maritime domain aware-
ness, intercepting suspicious vessels and high-tech 
vessel inspection technology confirms the new em-
phasis on anti-terror in the US Navy. Although not 
explicitly mentioned, the strategy clearly targets 
the connections between terrorism, attacks against 
the American homeland and weapons of mass de-
struction (WMD), as well as conventional forms of 
smuggling. In fact, these issues received as much 
attention as nuclear deterrence and ballistic missile 
defence together. Furthermore, the vastness of the 
oceans makes it hard to detect terrorists and crimi-
nal activities and terrorists possess limited means 
to operate on the open ocean, meaning that these 
operations would have be conducted primarily in the 
littorals, preferably as far away from the US as pos-
sible, but if necessary in US territorial waters.
And here the impact of 9/11 is obvious: “[t]he events 
of 11 September 2001 tragically illustrated that the 
promise of peace and security in the new century is 
fraught with profound dangers”. This concern with 
attacks on the American homeland is a new feature 
of post-Cold War strategies. Former strategies were 
concerned with influencing events abroad, and did 
not consider the possibility of having to defend the 
US directly. This new awareness did not warrant a 
change in geographic priorities, however. Following 
in the footsteps of the strategies of the 1990s, Sea 
Power 21 did not specify a particular region or re-
gions as areas of special interest but was seemingly 
content with locating where the dangers of the new 
century were to be found,  i.e. in “nations poised for 
conflict in key regions, widely dispersed and well-
funded terrorist and criminal organizations, and 
failed states that deliver only despair to their peo-
ple.” At first sight, this seems rather vague, but it did 
limit the areas of interest somewhat, as the above 
“definition” more or less excluded Western Europe, 
while the Western Pacific, the Middle East, Africa 
and pretty much any hotspot in the world would be 
included. 
Seen as a whole, Sea Power 21 did not represent a 
definite change in the geographic priorities of the US 
Navy. There were other tangible signs, however, of 
Europe’s declining importance. One of the reasons 
for Europe’s dwindling significance was the division 
of the Atlantic as a unified theatre of war. While the 
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whole Atlantic had constituted a single geographic 
command which, in practice, was basically preoc-
cupied with Europe, by 2002 it was divided into 
three geographic commands: Northern Command, 
responsible for North America; Southern Command, 
responsible for South America; and European Com-
mand. What is more, the Mediterranean ceased to 
be a hub for a combat credible forward presence, a 
move that basically stripped it of many of the war-
ships that were stationed there and transferred them 
to other areas. The Global Defense Posture Review, 
conducted by the Department of Defense between 
2002 and 2004, mandated an increase in the Pa-
cific forces at the expense of the European theatre. 
The declining importance of Europe is in line with 
the previous strategic documents, as is the vague-
ness: on the latter point, the strategy continues the 
post–Cold War trend.
The strike capability of the US Navy had proved to 
be an important and very effective contribution in 
bringing down the Taliban government of Afghani-
stan, and it had also been used in the bombing cam-
paign against Serbia in 1999. Also, at the time, the 
major buzzword in the US Department of Defense 
was transformation, with Secretary Donald Rums-
feld as its foremost proponent. Transformation was 
supposed to continuously change the US military by 
taking advantage of new technologies and concepts 
to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
armed forces. The network-centric warfare concept 
is a perfect example of this. This was not lost on the 
authors of Sea Power 21, who insisted on taking 
advantage of US superiority in this field to confront 
enemies “far seaward, taking advantage of the time 
and space afforded by naval forces to shield our na-
tion from impending threats.” (United States Navy 
2002) One can object to this by saying that both the 
Afghanistan and Serbian campaigns were conducted 
ashore, while the Navy operates in the maritime en-
vironment. But this would overlook a crucial point: 
that the lessons could be applied to the maritime 
environment, and perhaps especially the littorals, 
where the US Navy and the Marine Corps could ex-
ploit the advantages of the network-centric warfare 
concept against technologically inferior enemies.
At this point, there were several indications that the 
littorals were gaining importance in the US Navy. 
Conventional sea control operations were considered 
to be paramount, although primarily as enablers for 
power projection ashore: “Achieving battle-space su-
periority in forward theaters is central […] especially 
as enemy area-denial efforts become more capable.” 
(United States Navy 2002). This suggests that the 
US Navy was not expecting conventional threats 
close to the US or on the high seas. Combined with 
the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and new destroyer 
projects, both intended for littoral operations, it is 
natural to assume that the primary conventional 
threat was in the littorals.
This is very much a continuation of the sea control 
aspect of Anytime, Anywhere, although it did not re-
ceive the level of attention it had done in the 1997 
publication. As was previously noted, sea control 
in the littorals was primarily seen as an enabler for 
power projection ashore, and the importance of lit-
toral operations is obvious for two reasons. The US 
Navy had been planning a littoral destroyer since 
the early 1990s, but the first tangible project was 
the Streetfighter concept, which was launched in 
1999. The Streetfighter project never materialised, 
however, and was replaced by the Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS) programme in 2001. Although a littoral 
combatant was mentioned in Anytime, Anywhere, the 
LCS was one of the first concrete measures to be 
mentioned in strategic documents. The mere refer-
ence to the Littoral Combat Ship project in the strat-
egy indicates that littoral operations were considered 
both highly relevant and important. Furthermore, 
Sea Power 21 represented an affirmation of the 
close relationship between the Navy and the Marine 
Corps. The Sea Basing section discussed the Navy-
Marine Corps advantages in projecting power by, 
among other things, replacing on-shore bases with 
prepositioned equipment off-shore. The rationale 
was that, with proliferation of WMDs and declining 
availability of overseas bases, “it is compelling both 
militarily and politically to reduce the vulnerability of 
US forces through expanded use of secure, mobile, 
networked sea bases.” The implication of this was 
that the US Navy had to have the capability to com-
mand the littorals, or else there would be no power 
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projection ashore. During the 1990s, there was a 
similar, although somewhat varying focus on litto-
ral operations and Sea Power 21 continues this line 
in striking a balance between blue water and littoral 
considerations.
The Navy’s budget in 2002 was $125 billion, up 
from $121 billion the year before, and by 2005, 
the budget amounted to $152 billion. Also, for the 
first, and only, time in the post-Cold War period, the 
number of personnel also increased this year, from 
378,000 in 2001 to 383,000 in 2002. The added 
resources were reflected in the new force goal from 
2002, set at 375 ships, a clear increase from the 
previous force goal of 305. As a consequence, the 
shipbuilding plans underwent some major develop-
ments, perhaps the most interesting of which is the 
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) programme, launched in 
November 2001. As Ronald O’Rourke states in his 
December 2004 report to Congress: “The primary 
intended missions of the LCS are countering enemy 
mines, submarines, and fast attack craft (sometimes 
called ‘swarm boats’) in heavily contested littoral 
(near-shore) waters.” (O’Rourke 2004, 1). The Navy 
wanted to build between 30 and 60 hulls, amount-
ing all told to between $7.5 billion and $15 billion, 
depending on the number of hulls (O’Rourke 2004, 
2). The planned investment in LCS was quite sub-
stantial, although in comparison, the first two ships 
of the new littoral destroyer class would cost about 
$3 billion per ship (O’Rourke 2010, 4, 12). Con-
sidering the scale of the destroyer programmes, the 
planned LCS investment was modest no matter how 
many ships were procured; however, it would still in-
crease the littoral capabilities of the US Navy signifi-
cantly. The second development was that of the new 
destroyer. Originating in the 1990s, when the pro-
gramme was designated DD-21, the Navy first en-
visaged 32 ships. This was reduced to between 16 
and 24 ships in 2001 when the programme was of-
ficially announced and designated as a littoral com-
batant, and further reduced to between eight and 12 
in 2005. By 2006, the number was down to seven 
(O’Rourke 2006, 7). The third development was the 
initiation of the new cruiser programme on Novem-
ber 1, 2001, a ship that was planned to replace the 
Ticonderoga class of cruisers, and thus falling into 
the blue water category of ships.8 (The new cruiser 
would have an emphasis on air defence and ballis-
tic missile defence.) This increase in shipbuilding 
plans, and their distinctly littoral orientation, in the 
early part of this decade can be seen in connection 
with the increase in defence budgets that came af-
ter the events of 9/11. The background for the cuts 
in the destroyer programme around 2005/2006 is 
difficult to determine. However, it is natural to as-
sume that the rising power of China and the certain 
prospects of a change in defence policy beyond the 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan were two factors.
GREAT POWER RIVALRY AND CHINA
The truncation of the destroyer programme came at 
a time when the US security policy establishment 
was tentatively moving beyond the immediate needs 
of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Navy 
was no exception in this development, and looking 
to the future, the Navy started changing its strategic 
approach. By the end of the first decade of the 21st 
century, aggression by regional powers, and espe-
cially China, was claiming the top spot in Navy plan-
ning. The US was forced to recognise that the world 
was moving from a uni-polar to a bi- or multi-polar 
power structure faster than many experts had pre-
dicted, and US economic problems in the form of a 
tremendous budget deficit, and an even bigger debt, 
had made it clear that major changes were in store 
for the entire Department of Defense.
As for the Navy, the last half of the decade was a 
period of adaptation to this situation. Although still 
tending to littoral warfare and irregular operations, 
an expanding and more assertive China held its at-
tention. This led to increased emphasis on tradi-
tional blue water operations, accompanied by a geo-
graphic focus on the Western Pacific and the Indian 
Ocean at the expense of the European orientation. 
Besides terrorism and emerging powers, a number 
of other issues, not traditionally associated with na-
vies, gained urgency. Piracy, for instance, became a 
21
major concern of the US Navy, as did humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief, while the campaigns 
in Afghanistan and Iraq seemed to have provided 
new understanding of the complexities of conflicts. 
However, by 2010, with the Afghan and Iraqi con-
flicts in mind, the US appetite for military interven-
tion abroad had lessened. Despite all the talk about 
piracy and unconventional conflicts, attention was 
increasingly directed at the potential for great power 
rivalry in the Pacific, as well as the challenges of 
North Korea and Iran. Furthermore, as a reaction to 
the largely unilateral path chosen earlier in the Bush 
presidency, and the realisation of the limits on US 
Naval power, the Navy placed a heavy emphasis on 
multilateral cooperation, as well as joint operations 
with the other armed services, the new mantra be-
ing partnerships. This was the basis of what Chief 
Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullen in October 
2006 termed the “1000 Ship Navy”, a partnership 
between maritime nations to improve maritime se-
curity.
COOPERATIVE STRATEGY 
FOR 21ST CENTURY SEAPOWER
This new focus was apparent in the US Navy’s A 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS 
21), published just over six years after the events 
of 9/11, although it had been renamed the Global 
Maritime Partnership in order to appear more inclu-
sive to other nations.9 None of the post-Cold War 
strategic documents had claimed to be actual strate-
gies; rather they were billed as strategic concepts, vi-
sions or the “way ahead”. With CS 21, the US Navy 
had an official strategy for the first time since the 
Maritime Strategy was published in 1986. Published 
towards the end of the second presidential term of 
George W. Bush, the authors wished to influence 
both the current and next administration, and to 
demonstrate that the “Navy was in vanguard [sic] of 
needed national security concept changes.” (Swartz 
2010, 1254).
In the years since Sea Power 21 was published, the 
US had invaded Iraq. Despite overwhelming initial 
success, this venture proved to be much more dif-
ficult than the US political leadership expected. By 
2007 the security in Iraq had deteriorated, with dif-
ferent ethnic groups engaged in an insurgency that 
was akin to a civil war. The war on terror reached 
a temporary peak at this point in time, with the 
surge of extra US troops to Iraq and the adoption of 
new counterinsurgency tactics in order to deal with 
the rising levels of violence (Lundesgaard 2009; 
Kronvall 2007). Concurrently, the campaign in 
Afghanistan was also running into difficulties. To-
gether with the Iraq conflict and the war on terror 
in general, these campaigns had been the natural 
focal points of the US military. Maritime issues like 
sea control, power projection and littoral operations 
were no longer at the forefront of events as they had 
been during the 1990s. The relief effort following 
the 2004 tsunami in South-East Asia saw extensive 
naval contributions by, among others, the US Navy, 
while pirate activity, climate change and the problem 
of failed states gained more urgency. The events and 
conflicts of this decade clearly influenced the new 
strategy. Their complexity was recognised by the 
authors of several US military publications, perhaps 
especially by those of the new counterinsurgency 
manual published jointly by the Marine Corps and 
the Army. This approach was also evident in CS 21, 
which represented a major step away from the Ma-
hanian approach to sea power that was advocated 
in the Maritime Strategy, embracing a comprehen-
sive approach to maritime security very much akin to 
Geoffrey Till’s concept of a post-modern navy. In an 
article referring specifically to the strategy, Geoffrey 
Till finds CS 21 to be “much more comprehensive 
in its approach [than previous Navy documents] and 
seems much more aware of the implications and 
consequences of the broader […] concepts of secu-
rity” (Till 2008, 28).
Taking this comprehensive approach, the authors of 
CS 21 expanded the list of threats. “Major power 
war, regional conflict, terrorism, lawlessness and 
natural disasters—all have the potential to threaten 
US national security and world prosperity.” (United 
States Navy 2007) Major power war and regional 
conflict were the the US Navy’s raisons d’être. Dur-
ing the 1990s, regional instability was considered 
the major challenge, but with CS 21 major power 
war became, for the first time since the Cold War, 
an important issue. But CS 21 also pursued and ex-
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panded on issues that are not considered to be tradi-
tional naval issues. “While defending our homeland 
and defeating adversaries in war remain the indis-
putable ends of seapower, it must be applied more 
broadly if it is to serve the national interest.” Under 
the heading “challenges of the new era”, a range of 
issues beyond traditional naval tasks were addressed, 
including the effects of climate change, technology, 
poverty, religious extremism, weak and corrupt gov-
ernments among others. All could cause traditional 
and non-traditional conflicts as well as crime. What 
is genuinely new here is how the Navy intended to 
solve these issues. In The Way Ahead, the Navy’s role 
was to combat the threats resulting from these is-
sues, a way of treating the symptoms and not the 
cause of the threat. In CS 21, the actual cause of 
the conflict, be it poverty, ideology, interstate rivalry 
or something else, was introduced as a challenge on 
the grounds of its potential to produce threats. This 
new approach is a cornerstone of the document with 
the authors affirming that “[w]e believe that prevent-
ing wars is as important as winning wars.” (United 
States Navy 2007). Geoffrey Till has pointed out 
that the prevention of war was “less than novel given 
the great stress on deterrence in the Cold War era, 
which was after all about preventing war.” What is 
new is how deterrence was defined in the strategy: 
what does seem to be different is the much wider 
conception of what deterrence actually means 
and actually requires these days. The coercive 
approach of demonstrating denial capabilities 
against, or promising punishment for, prospec-
tive wrongdoers has been absorbed into a much 
wider concept of working against the social, en-
vironmental, and economic conditions that make 
wrongdoing more likely (Till 2008, 27-28).
The new concept of deterrence was designed to pre-
vent threats from arising, and when they occurred, 
they would be met by the naval services before they 
reached US shores. There was no mention of spe-
cific state actors posing, or likely to pose, a threat 
or challenge. Nevertheless, certain priorities made 
in the document indicated causes for concern. Con-
ventional actors falling into this category are most 
likely North Korea, China and Iran. This observation 
is based on the authors’ intention of having cred-
ible combat power “continuously postured in the 
Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean 
to protect our vital interests, assure our friends and 
allies of our continuing commitment to regional se-
curity, and deter and dissuade potential adversaries 
and peer competitors” (United States Navy 2007). 
This touches upon the geographic priorities of the 
US Navy.
With regard to unconventional threats, the strat-
egy does not mention specific actors, something 
one wouldn’t expect anyway due to the innumer-
able terrorist and criminal organisations and their 
elusive nature. It does provide a range of different 
categories of actors, and it is clear from reading CS 
21 that the perception of threat has changed signifi-
cantly since the previous strategic publications. The 
US Navy was primarily concerned with conventional 
threats in the 1990s, with unconventional threats 
limited in Sea Power 21 to terrorism. In CS 21 the 
unconventional actors were grouped under the term 
transnational threats, which referred to “terrorists 
and extremists; proliferators of weapons of mass de-
struction; pirates; traffickers in persons, drugs, and 
conventional weapons; and other criminals.” (United 
States Navy 2007) The list of threats had expanded 
since Sea Power 21 was published, a natural con-
sequence of the comprehensive approach that was 
taken to the strategy and a result of the post 9/11 
security environment that was described above.
The absence of an explicit reference to an adversary 
or adversaries, or levels of threat, has attracted some 
criticism, and as William T. Pendley puts it: “It is not 
adequate merely to catalogue threats, which is what 
this new maritime strategy does. To be relevant, it 
must prioritize the threats in terms of both their 
timing and danger to American national interests.” 
(Pendley 2008) He continues by emphasising the 
primacy of the threat posed by radical Islamic terror-
ists, followed by the possibility of conflict on the Ko-
rean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait . Others that 
have been involved in the process, such as, Robert 
C. Rubel, contend:
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In developing the strategy, we realized that one of 
the real dangers, especially with regard to emerg-
ing powers, is that considering them hostile for 
planning purposes could be self-fulfilling.
He contrasts CS 21’s “‘opportunity based’ plan-
ning” (positioning the maritime services to take 
positive actions to prevent war, protect the global 
system, and create a better peace), with threat and 
capability based planning (Rubel 2008). Capability 
based planning, which replaced threat based plan-
ning in the 1990s, uses scenarios in military plan-
ning, and the force structure and plans are based on 
these. Notwithstanding any debate about the (lack 
of ) threat assessments in CS 21, compared to previ-
ous strategy publications there are several significant 
differences.
The geographical priorities of the US Navy have been 
touched upon quite briefly, but they had obviously 
changed quite significantly since the publication of 
Sea Power 21. Looking beyond Iraq and Afghani-
stan, the plan set out by the authors to focus combat 
forces in the Western Pacific and Arabian Gulf/Indi-
an Ocean signalled a reorientation of the geographi-
cal priorities of the US Navy, a natural development 
considering the security environment outlined above 
and particularly interesting seen in light of the men-
tioning of major power war. Taking the US diplo-
matic relations and the general security situation in 
these areas into account, the US Navy is clearly, if 
implicitly, referring to China, North Korea and Iran. 
In addition, CS 21 “recognizes the rising importance 
and need for increased peacetime activities in Africa 
and the Western Hemisphere”, and also refers to the 
Arctic as an area with a potential for conflict as the 
ice recedes (United States Navy 2007). An inter-
esting observation is that the only areas that did not 
receive any mention were Europe and Oceania, the 
former being the main focus of the US Navy for half 
a century. This shift in priorities was not just cos-
metic. It was very much a real shift, insofar as the 
basing structure and home basing of US Navy ships 
changed as well. In 2007, and for the first time in 
60 years, there were more ships based in the Pacific 
than the Atlantic, and several major US Navy bases 
in Europe were closed in the period around the pub-
lication of CS 21. The shift to the Pacific was man-
dated in the Global Defence Posture Review from 
2004 and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review 
Report, both of which opened up for a rebasing of 
naval assets (Swartz 2010). Although not explicitly 
mentioned in CS 21, Europe was clearly not priority 
number one for US naval forces. It was stated that 
US naval forces in Europe would “remain among the 
best in the world and will enable rapid movement 
of forces into, through, and from Europe”, but “be 
supported by a leaner command structure.” In the 
Asia-Pacific the US would improve “regional military 
forces, such as the forward deployment of additional 
expeditionary maritime capabilities” (United States 
Department of Defense 2004, 11–12). This pro-
cess of rebasing is projected to leave 58 per cent of 
the ships based in the Pacific, with the remainder 
based in the Atlantic (O’Rourke 2010, 49). This 
shows that CS 21 reflected the actual geographic 
priorities of the Navy. The changes in force structure 
predated the change in the strategic publications, 
and by implication, a substantial change in strategy 
occurred before the strategy was written.
With so many new priorities, the focus on littoral op-
erations disappeared from the document. This must 
not be confused with a reduction in the perceived 
importance of the littorals, however. First of all, blue 
water operations were not mentioned either. Second, 
the focus on peace time operations and the preven-
tion of conflict did not invite a discussion of the most 
likely operating environments. Hence, after 16 years 
of operational focus the US Navy produced a strategy 
that once again focused on the strategic challenges. 
Again, this did not mean that the littorals lost all im-
portance. Indeed, a careful reading of the document 
shows a continuing emphasis on these areas. One of 
the main tenets of CS 21 was the importance of the 
maritime domain, and especially the coastal areas:
Over the past four decades, total sea borne trade 
has more than quadrupled: 90% of world trade 
and two-thirds of its petroleum are transported 
by sea. The sea-lanes and supporting shore in-
frastructure are the lifelines of the modern global 
economy, visible and vulnerable symbols of the 
modern distribution system that relies on free 
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transit through increasingly urbanized littoral re-
gions (United States Navy 2007).
To uphold this free transit, the US Navy would have 
to operate in the littorals together with its partners in 
the proposed Global Maritime Partnership. The ba-
sic premise for this partnership was that the US Navy 
would not be able to secure this access by itself, and 
depended on contributions by other maritime na-
tions. Unless the intention was to hand this kind of 
constabulary task over to the partners, the US Navy 
would be forced to operate in the littorals, and go-
ing by the statements in CS 21, this was indeed the 
plan. “[US] security and prosperity are inextricably 
linked with those of others, US maritime forces will 
be deployed to protect and sustain the peaceful glob-
al system comprised of interdependent networks of 
trade, finance, information, law, people and govern-
ance.” (United States Navy 2007) Abdicating this 
kind of responsibility would create a dependency on 
partners and a “hole” in US Navy capabilities, which 
would become very apparent were a conflict of inter-
est to arise between the US and partner countries 
on these issues. At the same time, Navy capabili-
ties in conventional, blue water, conflicts were ulti-
mately considered the most important. As pointed 
out above, “defending our homeland and defeating 
adversaries in war remain the indisputable ends of 
Seapower” (United States Navy 2007). Thus, this 
strategy continued the priorities of the earlier strat-
egies by striking a balance between conventional 
blue water capabilities on the one side and littoral 
capabilities on the other, with an emphasis on the 
primacy of the former.
There is nevertheless a difference between strategy 
and reality. The challenges referred to in CS 21 im-
plicitly refer to the extent of the littoral orientation 
of the Navy in that they all, with the exception of 
China, are located in the littorals. This did not render 
littoral capabilities untouchable, however. In an en-
vironment of budget cuts and numerous challenges, 
priority is given to the greatest challenge; by 2010, 
this challenge was clearly identified.
There was no let up in the downsizing of the US 
Navy after the turn of the century, despite rising 
budgets. But it had slowed to a steady trickle by the 
early 2000s, and the rising cost of military equip-
ment probably contributed strongly to this develop-
ment. The nature of these developments was much 
the same as those of the 1990s, which produced a 
scaled down version of the Cold War fleet, but with 
individually more capable ships. A few develop-
ments deserve special mention. Towards the end of 
the period, on November 8, 2008, the first of a total 
of 55 Littoral Combat Ships was commissioned. The 
LCS programme, which was launched on November 
1, 2001, the commissioning of the first ship in No-
vember 2008, and the continuing plan to procure 
a total of 55 ships show how serious the US Navy 
was about operating in the littorals. The shipbuild-
ing plans of 2001, more specifically the LCS, the 
new classes of cruisers and destroyers, continued 
through to the publication of CS 21, although the 
destroyer programme had again been reduced and 
was planned to consist of only seven hulls. 
And this is where the littoral capabilities were losing 
out. By 2010, the Navy stopped the production of its 
new destroyer, with only three ships produced.  The 
Navy decided instead to resume the 1990s Burke 
class destroyer programme in 2008–2009, because 
the new class emphasised “land-attack operations 
and operating in littoral waters”. The decision to 
abort this program was partly based on the grow-
ing concern about Chinese anti-access capabilities. 
Another contributing factor were the clear signals 
from Congress of defence budget cuts towards the 
end of the decade. The US economy had not been 
doing well at the time and had accumulated a large 
deficit. The situation continued to deteriorate after 
the 2008 financial crisis, and the new destroyer pro-
gramme was of the expensive sort. In another major 
development, the Navy cancelled the new cruiser 
programme in its entirety in 2010 and replaced it 
with an upgraded version of the Burke class destroy-
er on grounds of unaffordability.
From around 2005, the Global War on Terror’s grip 
on the US Navy started to slip, and the littoral surge 
of the first half of the decade also started losing mo-
mentum. The first sign was the implicit references 
to China, Iran and North Korea in the Cooperative 
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Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, but the trend 
continued to the end of the decade with the US 
Navy increasingly emphasising blue water platforms, 
the Littoral Combat Ship being the exception. At the 
time of writing, in 2011, peer competitors and con-
ventional blue water operations are the primary con-
cern, and given the current security and economic 
situation, which remains relatively unchanged, this 
is likely to continue into the second decade of the 
20th century.
CONCLUSION
As the Cold War ended, the 1990s presented the 
US Navy with a radically new security situation as 
well as substantial budgets cuts. Everything from 
strategy to doctrine and force structure was config-
ured to tackle a conflict with the Soviet Union along 
Mahanian lines. The US Navy struggled to come 
to terms with its role in this new system, which re-
sulted in a balancing act between the requirements 
for blue water operations on the one side, and the 
new requirements for littoral combat on the other. A 
major issue was defining what actually justified the 
US Navy, because there were no clearly discernable 
threats on which planning could be structured. Apart 
from vague references to regional conflicts, primarily 
occurring outside the Atlantic region, there were no 
clearly defined strategic challenges and threats. The 
US Navy therefore turned to operational challenges 
associated with projecting power in the world’s litto-
rals. Blue water operations were still seen as the pri-
mary task of US Navy, something the strategic docu-
ments throughout the period repeatedly made clear. 
It would be natural to see this blue water fascina-
tion as a deeply rooted part of US strategic culture. 
Indeed, as Roger W. Barnett remarks, The Maritime 
Strategy of 1986 “is striking not for its unique ap-
proach but for its broad, long-term continuity with 
Navy thinking and for its reflection of Navy Strate-
gic Culture.” (Barnett 2009, 97) But without a blue 
SHIP CATEGORY FY1999 FY2004 FY2009 % CUT/INCREASE
Strategic Submarines 18 14 14 -22 %
Cruise missile Submarines 0 4 4  
Nuclear fuelled attack submarines 57 53 53 -7 %
Attack submarines 0 0 0  
Aircraft Carriers 12 12 11 -8 %
Battleship 0 0 0  
Cruiser 27 25 22 -19 %
Destroyer 52 48 57 10 %
Frigate 37 30 30 -19 %
LCS 0 0 1  
Patrol craft 0 0 0  
Mine warfare 16 16 14 -13 %
Amphibious 41 37 33 -20 %
Other 57 52 46 -19 %
Total 317 291 285 -10 %
TABLE 2: This table shows the total number of ships in the Battle Force of the US Navy and the percentage cut or 
increase between 1999 and 2009. For more information on ship classes, see table 1.
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water adversary and faced with the uncertainty of 
the post-Cold War environment, the US Navy was 
forced to divert some of its attention to what were 
considered to be more pressing issues. A new range 
of littoral capable ships was being planned, although 
these plans had not been translated into actual ship-
building programmes yet, and ships primarily aimed 
at blue water operations received weapons and sen-
sors adapted to littoral operations. Thus, there was 
tension between what the strategies claimed to be 
the main operating environment in the new security 
environment, and the perceived need to be ready for 
blue water operations. The solution to this fumbling 
in the dark was to use the blue water force structure 
from the Cold War to operate in the littorals in order 
to influence events ashore. The new force structure 
was much slimmer than the Cold War fleet, but the 
construction of new ships, and the introduction of 
new technologies, meant that each individual ship 
was more capable than its predecessor, both for lit-
toral and blue water operations. Thus, by the end of 
the 1990s, the advocates of the blue water school 
had gained the upper hand.
In contrast to the 1990s, the first strategic docu-
ment that was published after the turn of the century 
was more concrete in its threat assessments, and 
also relatively littoral-minded. Heavily influenced 
by the ongoing Global War on Terror, terrorism and 
smuggling became the centrepiece of the US Navy’s 
Sea Power 21, and, taking the shipbuilding plans 
into account, it was also the heyday of the littoral 
school, with concrete plans for two new classes of 
littoral capable ships. The grip that the War on Ter-
ror held on planning was to be short-lived, however. 
By the middle of the decade there were signs that 
the Navy was looking beyond the Iraqi and Afghan 
conflicts, turning its attention to rising regional pow-
ers instead.
Taking these issues seriously, the authors behind A 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, which 
at the time of writing is the last strategic publica-
tion from the US Navy, took the unconventional ap-
proach even further than Sea Power 21 in adopting a 
comprehensive approach to its expanded definition 
of maritime security. Also, the previous emphasis 
on the operational challenges connected to access 
to the littorals disappeared in CS 21, but the focus 
on the economic importance of the coastal areas and 
the importance of securing the freedom of naviga-
tion in these areas confirmed the position of littoral 
operations. The Littoral Combat Ship programme 
underscores this further, in that the US Navy com-
missioned the first of this new class of ships in 2008 
and had plans to procure 55 hulls in total. Despite 
this, conventional blue water operations were con-
sidered to be the ultimate end of sea power, and in 
CS 21, the priority of combat credible forces in the 
Western Pacific and Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf, as 
well as the mention of great power conflict, points 
to China’s potential as a peer competitor and con-
ventional opponent at sea. The force structure also 
confirmed this. The US Navy was planning for a ma-
jority of blue water platforms, with the LCS as the 
only major littoral programme, and the Pacific now 
received priority of the combat ready forces.
The first decade of the 21st century is over, and we 
will probably see more changes in Navy strategy in 
the next few years. Developments in the Western 
Pacific, the rise of China specifically, have gained 
renewed urgency since the publication of CS 21. 
Another factor of possible concern to the US Navy 
is the ongoing challenge presented by North Korea, 
made even more urgent by the discovery of a new 
nuclear powered reactor and the shelling of a South 
Korean island in November 2010. The pressing is-
sues in Asia are likely to demand increasing atten-
tion in the coming years and will influence future 
strategy documents and emphasise the capability to 
engage and win in regular combat.
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ENDNOTES
1 According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, a good strategy would have the following makeup:
(1) purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) problem definition and risk assessment; (3) goals, subordinate objectives, 
activities, and performance measures; (4) resources, investments, and risk management; (5) organizational roles, 
responsibilities, and coordination; and (6) integration and implementation.(General Accounting Office 2004, 4)
None of the documents in this period contain all of these characteristics, and this article will not judge them explic-
itly by these criteria. They are important for students of strategy as an analytical toolbox.
Below the strategic level of war, connecting the strategic level with the tactical level of war, are operations, and the 
operational level of war. The operational level is used to exploit tactical events and give them strategic meaning, and 
often take the form of a campaign, tying several tactical engagements either sequential or simultaneous to produce 
strategic effect. For more on the operational level of war, see Milan Vego’s article, Major Naval Operations, or his 
book Operational Warfare at Sea (2008, 2009).
2 I shall not be including the strategic submarines in my discussion of the force structure discussion on the grounds 
that they are largely separate from the strategic planning of the US Navy. Bringing in nuclear deterrence would also 
introduce a range of theories, international agreements, conventions and other considerations that fall outside the 
scope of this article. 
3 For more on the development of the Base Force, see (Jaffe 1993).
4 The US Military defines the littorals as comprising “two segments of battlespace: 1. Seaward: the area from the 
open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. 2. Landward: the area inland from 
the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea.” (United States Department of Defense 2010)
5 All budget figures are in fiscal year 2009 dollars.
6 In the US Navy, the primary role of the destroyer is to be a so called multi-mission platform, able to engage targets 
in the air, on the surface and underwater, with an emphasis on air defence and ballistic missile defence. The new 
destroyer class was intended to emphasise land attack capabilities to support operations on land, making up for the 
loss of such capabilities when the battleships were decommissioned.
7 There are several classes of amphibious ships, descriptions of which are available on these pages: 
 http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=400&ct=4
 http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=500&ct=4
 http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=600&ct=4
 http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=1000&ct=4
8 Its primary missions would be anti air warfare and ballistic missile defence (O’Rourke 2010, 1). 
9 The 1000 Ship Navy concept was basically an international coalition of maritime powers whose aim was to protect 
the freedom of navigation in international waters. However, its title inevitably created connotations  to the (ex-
clusively US) 600 ship Navy proposed by Navy Secretary Lehman during the 1980s. To many of the prospective 
international partners this implied a high degree of US control of other navies and they were therefore sceptical of it.
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